Memorandum to Canada-Asia Working Group: Mining and the Marinduque Environment

To: Canada-Asia Working Group, Toronto
From: David Wurfel, Visiting Professor, University of the Philippines Re: Placer Dome/Marcopper Mining and Marinduque Environment March 6, 1998

The environmental damage from mining is much more extensive and the future dangers greater than most people outside Marinduque realize. Even though I had read extensively about conditions there and been briefed by people in Manila, I was not. adequately prepared for what I saw and heard in a six day visit.

I arrived by plane on Wednesday morning, Feb. 18th, and returned to Manila on Monday afternoon Feb. 23rd, by boat and bus. In Boac I visited the Social Action Center (SAC) and talked with Msgr. Senen Malapad, and others; visited the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) office and discussed with Trina Malaga; talked with Mayor Madla, with Mrs. Obdulia Palacios of the Department of Social Welfare (OSW), with Bob Telford of Placer Dome Technical Services (POTS), and briefly with Ralph Ante of Marcopper. I toured the Boac River valley from Bgy. Hinapulan to the river’s mouth, talking with barangay officials. In Mogpog I visited the most affected barangays along the river, Nangka and Boboc, talking with both barangay captains. In Santa Cruz I talked with Mayor Red and Engr. Cesar Montante; toured the tailings causeway and talked to the staff of the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project (CBRP); and visited Bgy. Botilao, where I discussed the situation with council members.

In Manila I had visited the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center, talking to Atty. Marvic Leonen; talked to staff of the Center for Environmental Concerns and the Citizen’s Disaster Response Center; consulted with Sister Aida Velasquez of Lingkod Tao-Kalikasan; talked with lawyers in the legal division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (OENR); and discussed.the situation with John Loney and others at Placer Dome Incorporated (POI) in Makati.

Let me present my findings by municipality.


The river valley looks like a desert, covered with the gray dust of tailings. That dust was particularly bothersome to my eyes after a day of travelling through it. Though the water looks clear, most villagers avoid contact with it. Few use it for washing. There are absolutely no fish, except at the brackish mouth. Since travel to the higher barangays is along a road that criss-crosses the river, in the next rainy season it will be impassable. (One road constructed especially for such circumstances by Marcopper is too steep for any but four-wheel drive vehicles, and will probably be washed out in a heavy rain.) Access to these villages has been possible in the last year because of the very unusual drought caused by El Nino. The river bed was scraped by bulldozers in 1996 to deepen the channel in order to avoid flooding; the tailings and gravel were piled into dikes of uneven height, which will oxidize in the sun, exuding acids and releasing trace metals. According to PDl’s own report (PSIA, 1997,65) in February 1997 tailings showed the first signs of “acid rock drainage” (ARD).

Rehabilitation in the first few months included over 20 deep wells dug by PDI, and a medical clinic. PDI relies heavily on the April, 1996 UN study which concluded that even the river water clouded with tailings was “not immediately harmful to health”. “However,” in a passage not quoted by PDI the Report added, “the long-term effects, which could be correlated to the tailings, need to be evaluated by well-designed epidemiological studies”. The Report. said that, while the threat from the tailings is not immediate, “they could pose a longer term threat through the re-mobilization of trace metals”, (UN, 72) The Report also commented on the siltation dam at the top of the Boac River “which was found to have unacceptably high concentrations of trace metals which are known to be toxic to the environment.. .Such water should be contained and not released into the environment. 11 (UN, 69,70) It should be noted that this water was, in fact, over-flowing into the Boac River for years before the 1996 spill and having a noticeable impact on the fish population, even though the residents did not realize its toxicity at the time- which was concealed by PDI/Marcopper.

When the Department of Health found elevated metal concentrations in human blood samples in late 1996, PDI called the findings “confusing” and “premature”. Clearly a comprehensive study of present health hazards by an independent and highly professional body, as recommended in the UN Report, is urgently needed. People in Marinduque are not aware of any such study being planned, but are eager to have one; PDI reports that researchers from the Canadian Public Health” Authority” (?) are scheduled to visit Marinduque in mid-March, but I have no information on what kind of study is anticipated.

PDI claims that Marcopper, then PDTS, funded a “Medical Mission” which treated 12,000 people, but found “no illnesses related to the spill so far”. (PSIR, 11) It should be noted that these doctors were providing clinical services, not engaging in the research which would be necessary to come to such a conclusion.

Commitment for compensation to victims for loss of income so far has been . provided only for 1996. Several barangays among those which have made claims have not yet been paid for the last four months of that year, primarily due to the elaborate process of checking by the Assessment Committee (which includes, among others, church, NGO and local government representatives) and by PDI, probably justified under the circumstances. According to the DSW, the total amount paid out as of Feb. 24th is P24,462,527. No claims for payment in 1997 have yet been accepted, though fishermen I talked to claim they have had no improvement in catch over 1996, and thus continue to need help. PDI is willing to consider claims for 1997, but probably at a lower level than those for 1996. Considering that claims are paid with checks signed and personally handed out by Mayor Madla, some distancing from the political process in the period prior to the election is probably desirable — payments for 1997 could begin on June 1, 1998.

The amounts approved for payment have not been based simply on requests of the individual victims, but ceilings for certain categories of fishermen, farmers and washerwomen were set, despite the objections of some members of the Assessment Committee. The Marcopper representative on the Committee took the lead in insisting on ceilings, according to some reports. The PRRM member of that Committee, one of three NGO representatives, has not been participating in its work in recent months, — perhaps in reaction to charges made within the community that PRRM was “too close” to Marcopper.

Claimants are, as noted, paid by check, a procedure with some advantages, but to cash that check they must either travel two to five hours (roundtrip) to the Santa Cruz branch of the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), or cash it at a bank in Boac and pay a P50 fee! (A very substantial deduction from compensation given the incomes of most villagers. One would have hoped that Marcopper, a major customer of RCBC, could have arranged to waive that fee in this instance. Or perhaps PDI itself should pay the fee. )

Removal of the one million cubic’meters of tailings (about 2/3 of the total) remaining in the river bed is still a very big problem; there is no agreement on how to go about it. (About a half million cubic meters were already washed into the sea.) In July of last year Marcopper (not PDI) made an application to DENR for a permit to redredge the Boac channel (near the mouth of the river where a pit is now holding 500-600,000 cubic meters of tailings) and discharge these tailings through a pipe to 35 meters below sea level, 500 meters off shore. The redredged channel at the river mouth would then hold the remaining tailings that would gradually be washed down by the rain, only a small part of which would reach the sea. Marcopper claimed that their studies concluded that the “deep sea” [35 meter] discharge would be swept by ocean currents into very deep water and would thus do no damage to fisheries. Marinduque fishermen, in Boac and other municipalities did not agree; after three major failures in Marcopper engineering-while under PDI management (in Boac, Mogpog and Calancan Bay) company ‘experts’ have no credibility in the island.

Mayor Madla of Boac opposed the application, and DENR, after their own technical assessment, rejected it. Marcopper has asked DENR for reconsideration. Mayor Madla has proposed disposal of the tailings in the lower river to a landfill near the river mouth (adjacent to land he owns) but has not had the funds to commission technical studies to support the viability of that option; EMB has rejected it. He has also proposed that in the first ten kilometers of the river below the Tapian Pit, the remaining tailings be scraped up and trucked back to the Pit. Marcopper (or PDI?) is now studying this. For the sake of the residents a decision should be made shortly.

When Marcopper first made their application to DENR at the beginning of the 1997 rainy season they said “With the channel almost at full capacity there is a serious risk that during the 1997 wet season the tailing will be released into the sea in an uncontrolled manner.” Fortunately for the fishermen there has been almost no rain since then so the sea has not been further polluted. Weathermen are now predicting “La Nina” a wetter than usual rainy season beginning next July. So a few months more of inaction could be disastrous. Some observers in Marinduque suspect Marcopper (or PDI?) of favoring further delay to permit “uncontrolled disposal” so that they can avoid the cost of “controlled disposal”. Delay could then be blamed on Mayor Madla for opposing the Marcopper application. This suspicion may be entirely unjustified, and could be dispelled if PDI initiated early negotiations with the Mayor to come to a compromise agreement quickly enough to beat the oncoming rains—something I suggested to both parties.

PDI has also instituted some livelihood projects on its own, mainly the launching of three cooperatives. The first one for fishermen in Bgy. Tabigue at the mouth of the river, has already financed a number of motors for fishing banca by means of loans. (PDI gave a grant for purchase of the boats. some of which I saw.) This is a well intentioned initiative and in the short run seems to be successfull. Even initial loan repayments are coming in faster than scheduled. But in the longer run its viability could be in doubt. Unfortunately, the history of cooperatives in the Philippines which start with substantial funding from outside sources is not good—a process I have studied for more than 40 yeas. There is a tendency for the fishermen or farmers to think-that the government or wealthy donor does not really need the money back, so repayment is poor; and the frictions within the cooperative that develop from the effort to secure repayment cause the cooperative to collapse. The good will initially gained by the fund donor finally turns into resentment.

In this case, the problems are even more imminent. Though boats with motors can travel farther to fish. because of depressed prices (public fear of fish caught near the Boac River mouth) and fuel costs, there is no clear indication yet that fishermen’s income has increased since 1996, though PDI claims that it has. So the surplus over family subsistence which is assumed to allow for loan repayment may or may not exist. River fish had been used for supplementing the meager family diet but this is now impossible. Probably the motors should be given as ‘compensation.’

To be sure, finding a good mechanism for sustainable development is not easy; in any case, it is not a short term task. PDl is not now projecting its involvement beyond three years — entirely inadequate in this field of endeavor. There are, however, various alternatives. 1) A trust fund could be established, of P100 million or more, for use over the next decade by local NGOs, e.g. the Social Action Center, or PRRM, both of which have their own livelihood projects and cooperatives. 2) A more ambitious proposal comes from the mayor, to use a trust fund to establish income generating projects, such as an ice factory (now none in Marinduque) or a noodle factory (using cassava), returning the proceeds to the fund to be used for maintaining a health clinic. Such a plan could be successful, though as with everything, success would depend on who was given major responsibility. The mayor insists it should not be linked to the municipal government. One would hope that these and other options would be actively explored. But whatever the mechanism, it is essential that some provision be made by Placer Dome for long term care of those whose health problems, present or future, have been the result of mine-caused pollution. .

As you may know, there were criminal charges filed against the 1996 officers of Marcopper for the Boac spill. Some of the charges have been thrown out by the Court of First Instance judge in Boac, but others remain to go to trial. The retirement of the judge in February of this year caused a three month delay. But the legal division of DENR is actively working on the case—a classsic example of young, underpaid government lawyers facing the experienced, highly paid attorneys of a large company. One should not be confident about the victory of the prosecution, no matter what the facts.

Mayor Madla has also submitted a formal intention of filing a P1.2 billion civil suit against Marcopper, even though the company has recommended that he go after PDl in Canada instead. (I tried to explain to him the very slim chance of success of such a venture.) He, in cooperation with Msgr. Malapad, is contacting environmental lawyers in Manila to help him prepare the case.


This municipality, adjacent to Boac, has not received nearly the attention that it deserves. This may in large part be due to the fact that the mayor has, until now, been rather cozy with Marcopper — not exactly a ‘champion of the people’. (He cannot now run for reelection, but is putting up his wife.)

At the top of the Mogpog river Marcopper built an earthen siltation dam in 1990 to catch the silt associated with the run off after heavy rains from the San Antonio pit. Contrary to the most basic engineering requirements, it was constructed without a spill way. So in 1993 it broke at the time of a very heavy rain; there was severe flooding in the barangays along the river. Fortunately no one died. Marcopper never took responsibility for this nor offered direct compensation to the residents along the river. However, it did give a grant of approximately P3 million to the mayor of Mogpog, some of which was distributed to those who suffered from the flood, a maximum of P1 000 to each household. Marcopper also scraped the river with bulldozers to deepen the channel, and built a cement dike to protect, at least partially, the most exposed barangay, Bocboc — though the efficacy of the dike is in doubt. Marcopper is now cleaning the existing siltation dam so as to reduce the danger in case of another flood. But earlier plans to build a second siltation dam were put on hold when the mine stopped operating.

The water quality looks, to the untutored eye, much worse than the Boac River-even though Ralph Ante of Marcopper recently reported to the DENR in Manila that the river water was “just fine”. Residents complain of skin irritation. Fish kills have been reported as recently as January this year, after a locally heavy rain. But Marcopper denies any toxicity. Nevertheless its own study of heavy metal accumulation in fish tissues reports that “For some metals in some species, there were indications that the tissue concentrations were elevated in the Laylay Bay and Mogpog areas “ (PSIA, July 1997) As in Boac, a comprehensive independent health study is urgently needed, but PDI denies any responsibility. Following a study, Placer Dome should provide funds for long term health care.


This is the site of the oldest environmental disaster in Marinduque, which Marcopper and PDI are now attempting to downplay. The mine began to dump tailings in the Bay in 1975 via surface disposal (not deep sea) and continued to do so until 1991, The turbidity which this disposal caused immediately began to drive away the fish and covered coral and sea grass with the gray mud of tailings. Active damage continues. In the last few years storms have eroded 500 meters from the end of the ‘causeway’, the 7 kilometer spit of land made up entirely of tailings. Thus fresh tons of tailings are spread over the ocean floor.

The Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project(CBRP), supported by the Ecology Trust Fund set up by DENR order in 1988, and supervised by Marcopper, has been planting mangroves and other varieties of trees on the causeway, though many have died and the last kilometer or two before the end of the point looks like a desert. On older portions of the peninsula, however, tree planting seems to have been largely successful. The CBRP has also attempted to plant coral polyps on artificial reefs. The use of old tires failed, but the implantation on cement ‘reefs’ has been more successful, at least on a small scale. Sea grass was planted and even artificial (plastic) sea grass .was put in place where the natural grass would not grow. ‘(No one bothered to enquire whether the fish were fooled!) The CBRP has also been trying to monitor fish harvest, but their methods make no distinction between fish caught in the Bay and those caught outside, so their data is not a very useful measure of fish stocks in the Bay. And, of course, they have no baseline studies of their own regarding fish stocks and water quality prior to the pollution of the Bay by Marcopper. Studies had been done, however, by other agencies before 1975 and presented by the fishermen to the National Pollution Control Commission when they tried to force Marcopper to stop dumping in 1986. These studies seem to have been forgotten by most present actors, but I am trying to locate them. Fishermen, supported by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, originally made claims for five hundred million pesos, in a case now being reactivated, but they may not have scientific studies sufficient to support their claims. Meanwhile Marcopper paid no compensation for loss of livelihood, but only gave small amounts of money to a few cooperatives, and offered some assistance to residents whose children were found by a study of Philippine General Hospital to have elevated heavy metals in the blood. In March 1996 the Acting Secretary of Health proposed the banning of the harvest, sale and consumption of fish and oysters in Calancan Bay which had been found to have heavy metal contamination, but was not supported by the DENR, so the ban was not implemented. CBRP authorized a ‘follow up study’ in order to ‘validate’ the earlier finding. (Local government representatives on the CBRP steering committee had been complaining that the Project only did research, and never followed up on the findings produced.) However, nothing more was heard of the ‘great fish scare of 1996’; apparently such a study was never done.

There is only about P7 million left in the Trust Fund, and given a recent court decision, it may not be renewed. In 1988 Pres. Aquino had overturned a Pollution Adjudication Board decision to stop the dumping of mine tailings in Calancan Bay. At the same time, recognizing the damage being done, the presidential order required Marcopper to make a contribution of P30,OOO per day to the Trust Fund. On June 30, 1991, Marcopper, by then having the option of dumping in the Tapian Pit, where mining had ceased, stopped discharging tailings into the Bay—though the pollution continued. At the same time, the mine unilaterally stopped making the daily contribution to the Fund, notifying DENR of its action. Not until early 1997, however, did Mayor Red of Santa Cruz, at the urging of the fishermen, remind the DENR that Marcopper was no longer making its daily payments. In April the DENR, having discovered that the presidential order in question had expired in 1993, directed Marcopper to make payments up to that time, amounting to about P26 million. Almost immediately Marcopper went to court asking for an injunction against the DENR. On January 7 of this year the Court of Appeals granted the request for a permanent injunction, arguing that the DENR had not followed due process in the manner it issued its directive..

If no further steps are taken, CBRP will expire in a year or so. While some of its activities have not been too effective, it could be the vehicle for more potent measures, especially if local fishermen were represented on its steering committee. Large rock could be brought in to halt further erosion on the point, valued fish types could be restocked in the Bay, fish farming techniques introduced, socio-economic impact studies could be launched, etc., etc.

But justice for the fishermen of Calancan Bay will not be done—or seen to be done, until there is direct compensation for economic loss; as in Boac. Both PDI and Marcopper have an uncooperative attitude on this matter: PDI insists that it is Marcopper’s responsibility, and Marcopper stonewalls. Thus there seems to be no other alternative to court action remaining. Yet so far there have been only feeble efforts to pursue compensation through the courts. A case was filed in 1988 with the help of the late Lorenzo Tanada, but was not pushed through. Then last year Mayor Red, on behalf of the fishermen, revived the case, estimating damages of over a billion pesos. More expert legal counsel is now being sought in Manila. But the data base of a forceful claim may be lacking without a new, highly professional independent assessment of economic loss and of health problems.


Not only the Calancan Bay area of Sta. Cruz is suffering as a result of the mine. Since the mine headquarters is located in the municipality and at peak employment several hundred residents worked in the mine, Sta. Cruz was perceived before as a bastion of support for Marcopper’s continuing operation.

But no longer. For one, a labor dispute between the mine and the Marcopper Employees Labor Union (MELU) which began in early 1995 has festered, with 335 workers already laid off at the time of the March 1996 closure. In January 1998 the

National Mines and Allied Workers, MELU’s national federation, issued a critical report on “The Mine-Related Environmental Disaster in Marinduque”.

Furthermore, the present drought is revealing the extent of damage caused by the San Antonio Pit to the town’s water sources. Water has customarily been taken from springs and spring-fed streams that originated from underground rivers in the mountain. As the San Antonio Pit was dug deeper and deeper some of these aquifers were ruptured; this is admitted by the PDI. This appears to be at least part of the reason that some surface streams have dried up for the first time in memory — the problem had been noted already before the present drought. For this there is no easy cure. It is an issue that affects everyone’s daily life.

Finally, Santa Cruz, as the site of the mine headquarters, suffers most from Marcopper’s non-payment of taxes since 1996. Mayor Red claims, and Mayor Madla confirms, that the mine now owes about P100 million (including all types of taxes to both provincial and municipal levels of government on the island). This further handicaps the town when dealing with the water crisis. The mayors are contemplating drastic action to recover this tax revenue. What is remarkable is that the unpaid taxes are greater than the total amount paid out to villagers in compensation or rehabilitation since 1996, so that PDI/Marcopper is, in effect, forcing the people of Marinduque to pay for the clean-up of the damage it caused!! To be sure Marcopper, without PDI, is now the tax delinquent; this is hardly consistent with PDI’s professed “core value of environmental responsibility” (PSIA, 140)


Placer Dome takes great pains to distinguish itself from Marcopper since it divested itself, apparently without compensation-other than freedom from liability in Calancan Bay, from this mine last year. It also complains that the public often fails to make the distinction. But perhaps the confusion is justified. In the Oct. 1997 “Post Spill Impact Report” there is reference to all the Filipinos and expats “hired by Marcopper/PDTS to solve the problems created by the spill.” (4) And on the Assessment Committee of the EGF which deals directly with villagers, Marcopper, not PDI, is represented.

Furthermore, for nearly 30 years Placer Dome managed Marcopper, for most of that time working hand in glove with the dictator, Marcos, who was majority owner through . his dummies. In that period the motto seemed to be “the environment be damned”. At the same time PDI and Marcopper enjoyed, in addition to profits, hundreds of millions of pesos in excused taxes. And PDI was administratively in charge when tailings were dumped in Calancan Bay without the slightest thought for the environment, when the Mogpog siltation dam was built — and broke, and when the Tapian Pit — whose tunnel had been ‘sealed for the ages’ — spilled into Boac Valley. PDI managed a mine which is said by some of its former employees, to nave imported toxic waste from other islands — without a permit — to be used for acid leaching, a waste which may help explain heavy metals showing up in human blood. A financial divestment in 1997 cannot wipe out memory of previous years’ events, which were shaped by PDI management.

It Is memory of past events that make so many Marlduqenos, rich and poor, weak and powerful; fear the future — if the mine is to reopen. For .the safety of the Tapian Pit is still in doubt. It still sits on an earthquake’ fault. The rock in its walls is cracked by frequent dynamiting. If the March 1996 breakage of the tunnel plug is to be blamed on an earthquake of magnitude 3.5, how much greater the danger from a more substantial quake. If the pit is full of tailings, and an earthquake ruptures the outer wall most of Boac could be wiped out by the ensuing flash flood. Could it be that PDI divested from Marcopper without compensation because it feared future disasters? Or was it because PDI was skeptical that DENR and the people of Marinduque could be convinced to approve the mine’s reopening?

In sum, if PDI wants to build an international reputation on respect for the environment, or if it wants to obtain future mining licenses in the Philippines, it must fulfill its obligations to the people who have to live in the environment it has damaged. Millions of dollars of additional compensation, health care and cleanup is needed. PDI can avoid these costs only at great risk.


Churches and NGOs in Canada can contribute to social justice and environmental protection in Marinduque, and in the Philippines generally-since Marinduque is setting important precedents, for good or ill by helping to clarify the actual conditions of health, livelihood and safety. Further visits by concerned laypersons are not needed, but assessments by technical experts are. A comprehensive, independent (and thus credible) study of the relationship between environment and health is essential for establishing the full dimension of PDl’s future responsibilities. This would include a careful assessment of water quality. An experienced mining engineer, with a commitment only to the environment and not to any mining company, is also needed to assess the safety of the Tapian Pit. And Calancan Bay and Mogpog deserve the same detailed assessment of the socioeconomic effect of pollution as was provided in Boac—at PDI/Marcopper’s expense but in cooperation with NGOs. Hopefully PDI and Marcopper will understand the advantages of fully accepting their responsibilities without facing more court battles. Forceful persuasion by churches and NGOs in Canada could help. But if it must be fought out in the courts, the companies should know that some prominent lawyers are becoming aware of the importance of precedents being set in Marinduque for the future of the Philippines, and thus are showing interest in a civil case there.

Canadians need to remember that while setting ‘guidelines’ and ‘benchmarks’for corporate behavior vis-a-vis the environment may be a useful exercise, without enforcement of existing law and regulations when those principles are violated makes them meaningless. The Marcopper case is being closely watched by dozens of other mining companies in the Philippines with pending applications for permits under the Mining Act of 1995. Unless PDl/Marcopper’s failure to meet their responsibilities is very expensive for the company, then other firms will regard existing laws and regulations lightly. The conditions of Philippine forests, rivers and oceans throughout the country and the livelihood of thousands, perhaps millions, of villagers and townspeople is at stake. Surely environmentally concerned Canadians—most of all those who have stock in Placer Dome— have a responsibility in this process as well.


“Application for a Permit to Redredge the Boac Channel with Managed Submarine Placement of Dredgate” , by Marcopper Mining Corp., Manila, 8 July 1997

Benjamin Alfante, et ai, in their own behalf and in behalf of other residents of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, plaintiffs, vs. Marcopper Mining CorporatiQn, defendant, Civil Case No. 18727 for abatement of nuisance and damages, “Complain!”, filed in Regional Trial Court, Makati, 12 Jan. 1988, by Atty. Lorenzo Tanada and Domingo Abadilla.

“Case Study on the Mine-Related Environmental Disaster in Marinduque: Summary of Findings and Recommendations”, by National Mines and Allied Workers Union, through assistance of ILO. Manila, 30 January 1998.

Coumans, Catherine, “Placer Dome in the Philippines: an illustration of the need for binding international regulations on mining”, pps. 53-68, in Social Investment Organization, Canadian Mining Industry Focus Report, 1997. Toronto, 1997. .

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et ai, complainants, vs. John E. Loney, et ai, respondents, I.S. No. 96-272, “Memorandum”, [from DENR legal staff requesting Department of Justice to file criminal charges], 31 May 1996.

“First Evaluation Report of the Health Assessment Activities of the Communities along Calancan Bay in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque [to the Secretary of Health]”, by Or. Nelia Maramba, Occupational Toxicology Program, DOH and Or. Cristina Dablo, Non-Communicable Diseas Control Service, DOH. Manila, 18 August 1997.

Marcopper Mining Corporation, petitioner, vs. The Polllution Adjudication Board, respondents, Court of Appeals-G.R. SP No. 44656, “Decision”, 7 Jan. 1998.

“The Marcopper Mine Tailings DisasterJl , by Citizens’ Disaster Response Center, Center for Environmental Concerns, Health Alliance for Democracy, Management Advance Systems Association, Inc., Social Action Commission of the Diocese of Boac, Prof. Nestor Baguinon of UP Los Banos, Engr. Lutgardo Jurcales of BAY AN, and Dale Hildebrand of Mennonite Central Committee. Manila, May 1996.

“The Marcopper-Placer Dome, Inc. Rehabilitation Strategies for the Boac River Ecosystem: A Report” , by Center for Environmental Concerns-Philippines, Citizens Disaster Response Center, Children’s Rehabilitation Center, IBONPhilippines, KAMP, AMIHAN and Social Action Center, Diocese ot” Boac. Manila, October 1.997.

Memorandum of Agreement: Operationalization of the Environment Guarantee Fund, between Environmental Management Bureau of DENR and Marcopper Mining Corporation, 29 June 1992.

Post Spill Impact Assessment, by Placer Dome Technical Services (Philippines) and PDI, Vancouver, July 1991.

Post Spill Impact Report, [by PDI], October 1977.

Proceedings of the Workshop to Develop an Integrated Management Plan for Calancan Bay, 13-14 March 1997 , SEARCA, UP Los Banos.

“Quality of the Waterbodies Affected by the Marcopper Mine Tailings”, by Nenita Tinoko, Chief, Laboratory Services Section, and Ella Deocadiz, Chief, Research and Development Division, Environmental Management Bureau, DENR,3 Ap~11996.

“Resolution Requesting Marcopper Mining Corporation and the Placer Dome of Canada to Undertake a Social Impact Assessment of the Effect of the Dumping of Mine Tailings in Calancan Bay, Sta. Cruz, Marinduque and to Pay the Damages Thereof [estimated at roughtly P500,000,000]”, Resolution No 60-A of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz,’ Marinduque, 24 October 1996. .

Social Impact Assessment of Marcopper Mine Tailing Spill Remediation Options, by the Centre for Human Settlements. School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia and the School of Urban and Regional Planning, University of the Philippines. Manila, June 1997.

United Nations, Final Report on Marinduque

Categories Philippines, General politics